It was inevitable. Eventually, President Donald Trump would treat a foreign adversary as harshly as Joe Scarborough and Mika Brzezinski.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un was on the receiving end of the alliteration heard around the world, when Trump promised “ re and fury” if Pyongyang continued to threaten the United States.

An American president has said this kind of thing before, although, it must be noted, he was actually in the act of waging a nuclear war. “They may expect a rain of ruin from the air,” President Harry S. Tru- man said of the Japanese after Hiroshima, “the like of which has never been seen on this Earth.”

As cable TV prepared to go to DEF- CON 1, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson popped up to smooth everything over with a generous helping of diplo-speak.

Tillerson supported what Trump said, but at times took a tone of polite distance from the president for whom he works. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, meanwhile, issued his own, much tougher statement. So, you can choose the president’s bellicosity, the secretary of defense’s rmness or the secretary of state’s palaver. Which re ects the administration’s true posture? Who knows?

In his own mind, Trump’s intention may really be to use military force to deny North Korea the capability to threaten the United States with a nuclear-armed ICBM. The goal is obviously a worthy one, but a raid against North Korea, even one con- ceived as limited, would have the potential

to spin into some- thing much broader. For a military operation that so- ber-minded people believe could, at the outer bounds of its destructiveness, cause more than a million casualties, the president should probably get authorization from Congress — when it’s not obvious that Con- gress can even pass a budget.

He’d need to undertake extensive war and postwar planning, mustering all rel- evant agencies of the U.S. government — when it’s still in doubt whether his new chief of staff can even succeed in keeping order within the Oval Of ce.

He’d need to get regional allies on board for a war that could bring untold destruc- tion to their countries — when South Ko- rea just elected a dovish president and we don’t even have an ambassador in Seoul.

He’d need to commit himself to an en- terprise that would require all of his attention in high-stress conditions for an ex- tended period of time — when he couldn’t stick with one position on the House- passed health care bill for more than a couple of weeks.

So it’s hard to see the president cashing this particular rhetorical check.

At least Trump’s words re ect a desire to do — or at least say — something different after three decades of bipartisan failure on North Korea. His is the rhetoric of strategic impatience, and given the his- tory, the impulse is understandable.

For years, we have pursued desultory sanctions against Pyongyang with inter- mittent negotiations conducted through a prism of self-delusion. The strategy of negotiating over a nuclear capability that you develop while talks are ongoing is a North Korea invention, borrowed, with great success, by the Iranians.

It’d be nice if Tillerson showed any awareness of this background as he mouths foreign-service talking points. According to Tillerson, we are not North Korea’s en- emy, we don’t seek regime change, and we just want to sit down and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula like good, reasonable people.

The middle ground between Trump’s saber rattling and Tillerson’s diplomatic pleading would be a comprehensive policy toward the goal of regime change. As former Bush administration of cial Robert Joseph argues, such a strategy would involve cutting off the North from the international nancial system, interdicting its weapons traf cking and perhaps shoot- ing down its test missiles or instituting a blockade.

If such an approach would have its own risks, at least it would be a strategy. If the Trump administration wants to really send a signal to Kim Jong Un, it should get itself together and pick one.

Rich Lowry can be reached via e-mail: comments.lowry@nationalreview.com